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Utah’s Enabling Act and Congress’s Enclave Clause 
Authority: Federalism Implications of a Renewed State 
Sovereignty Movement 
I. INTRODUCTION: UTAH’S CLAIM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION’S ENCLAVE CLAUSE 
On June 20, 1783, a disgruntled group of unpaid soldiers arrived at 
the statehouse in Philadelphia where the Continental Congress was 
convened.1 The following day, the soldiers surrounded the statehouse, 
demanding payment and attempting to intimidate the Congress by their 
mere presence; some soldiers at times even “point[ed] their muskets to 
the windows of the hall of Congress.”2 After drinking at neighboring 
taverns, the soldiers formed a mock obstruction as the Congress 
adjourned, but ultimately let the members of Congress pass through.3 
Mixed reports circulated about the group’s intentions—at one point the 
soldiers were reportedly “penitent,” while at another they were 
“meditating more violent measures.”4  
In response, Congress requested the presence of the state militia. As 
they waited for the state to respond, members in the body doubted 
whether the militia could force the group to disperse, as the soldiers’ 
obstruction may not have been considered “sufficient provocation.”5 
Two days later, Congress realized the state was not going to act, so they 
moved their deliberations to Trenton.6 Fueled by state inaction at 
Philadelphia, Congress later authorized the construction of a more 
 
 1. JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 
reprinted in 5 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 93 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
 2. Id. For a more complete description of the soldiers’ actions and the early history of the 
Enclave Clause, see THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER 
FED. AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, REPORT PART II: A TEXT OF THE LAW OF LEGISLATIVE 
JURISDICTION 15–28 (1957), available at http://constitution.org/juris/fjur /2fj1-2.txt [hereinafter 
JURISDICTION REPORT]. 
 3. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 93. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 2, at 17; see also ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 
1, at 94. 
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permanent home for itself along the Delaware River. Buildings were to 
be erected on land over which the United States would have “the right of 
soil, and an exclusive or such other jurisdiction as Congress may 
direct.”7 Although the immediate push for a piece of separate land would 
subside,8 the Framers ultimately incorporated the need for a separate 
location into the Constitution through a somewhat obscure provision, 
known as the Enclave Clause, which gives Congress power 
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of 
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of 
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority 
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State 
in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, 
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.9 
The Enclave Clause serves two main functions: first, it gives 
Congress exclusive authority over the seat of the federal government 
(now Washington, D.C.); second, it gives Congress authority to purchase 
state land for important government installations. However, due in part to 
state concern over federal encroachment, it also requires Congress to 
obtain consent if it desires exclusive authority over any of the land it 
purchases.10 As will be discussed at length in this Comment, the reach of 
the Enclave Clause and state jurisdiction over federal enclaves may 
actually be quite limited, given Congress’s expansive authority under the 
Property Clause and the Supremacy Clause.11 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has narrowly interpreted the reach of the Enclave Clause in a 
number of its decisions.12  
Although the reach of the Enclave Clause is quite narrow, the state of 
Utah has relied on the clause in its battle against the federal government 
 
 7. NEW JERSEY RESOLUTION, reprinted in WILLIAM TINDALL, ORIGIN AND GOVERNMENT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 39 (1909). 
 8. JURISDICTION REPORT, supra note 2, at 17 (“In view of the absence of a repetition of the 
experience which gave rise to the resolution, it may be that the feelings of urgency for the 
acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction diminished.”). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (the “Enclave Clause”). 
 10. See infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra Part III.D. 
 12. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. 
Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). The impact of these cases is described in greater detail in Parts III.C and 
III.E. 
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to regain control over the state’s public lands. Unlike the state of 
Pennsylvania, which could not protect Congress on state land during its 
deliberations in Philadelphia, Utah is actively attempting to expel the 
government from the state’s public lands.  
For example, on March 23, 2012, Utah Governor Gary Herbert 
signed the Transfer of Public Lands Act—a bill that denounces federal 
control over the state’s public lands.13 It threatens a lawsuit if the federal 
government fails to return title to the vast majority of its landholdings to 
the state by 2015.14 In 2010, Utah passed another bill claiming eminent 
domain authority over these lands because the federal government had 
not properly acquired the lands as required by the Enclave Clause.15 The 
strength of these two pieces of the state’s argument—its reliance on the 
Enclave Clause and attendant claim to eminent domain—are the main 
focuses of this Comment.  
In tying its argument to the Enclave Clause, the state relies primarily 
on the Utah Enabling Act (UEA), which President Grover Cleveland 
signed into law on July 16, 1894.16 In addition to bringing Utah into the 
Union, the Act effectively transferred title of state land to the federal 
government. However, it also provided for the sale and transfer of those 
lands back to the state, as follows: 
[F]ive per centum of the proceeds of the sales of public lands lying 
within said State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent 
to the admission of said State into the Union, after deducting all the 
expenses incident to the same, shall be paid to the said State.17 
Utah legislators have relied on this provision of the UEA in contending 
that the federal government has not fulfilled its obligation to sell off its 
public land holdings within the state, which currently amount to nearly 
sixty percent of Utah’s land.
18
 Because the lands have not otherwise 
been purchased under the Enclave Clause, the state of Utah contends that 
 
 13. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to -104 (West 2012). A more complete summary of the 
bill and its legislative history is available at http://le.utah.gov/~2012/bills/static/HB0148 .html. 
 14. Id. 
 15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). This bill, sponsored by Utah 
Representative Herrod, is discussed in greater detail in Part II.C. 
 16. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 §§ 3, 9 (1894). 
 17. Id. § 5. 
 18. The Open West, Owned by the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/western-land-owned-by-the-federal-
government.html. 
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its eminent domain authority extends over them.19 The state’s own 
legislative attorneys recognized the difficulty inherent in the state’s 
challenge,20 but the governor has deemed this uphill battle “a fight worth 
having.”21  
This Comment analyzes Utah’s Enclave Clause argument and 
concludes that although success in court is unlikely, any potential of such 
success hinges on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the UEA. Most 
centrally, Utah must successfully argue that the federal government’s 
ownership of the land is invalid. Part II discusses the history of public 
lands movements, including Utah’s, to demonstrate the difficult battle 
that the state will face. Despite this bleak history, and even if the Court 
does not permit Utah to exercise its eminent domain authority, the state 
will still certainly be able to exert pressure on the Obama Administration 
to scale back its more restrictive land use policies.  
Part III provides a history of the Enclave Clause and its development 
through Supreme Court precedent, while it also more thoroughly 
discusses each constitutional obstacle the state faces, including the Equal 
Footing Doctrine and the Property Clause. In conclusion, this Comment 
reviews the potential success of Utah’s Enclave Clause claim in this 
public lands debate and weighs Utah’s options in the current political 
atmosphere. 
II. PUBLIC LANDS MOVEMENTS: FROM THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION TO 
UTAH’S CURRENT EFFORTS 
The fight against federal ownership of public lands is not unique to 
Utah; in fact, proponents for state and local management of public lands 
have raised many of the same concerns during previous public lands 
movements, including the Sagebrush Rebellion and the County 
Supremacy Movement.  
A. FLPMA and the “Sagebrush Rebellion” 
The first major public lands movement, deemed the “Sagebrush 
 
 19. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). 
 20. Id. The constitutional note included by the state’s legislative attorneys can be found 
online as an appendage to the bill at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/hbillint/hb0143.pdf. 
 21. Debbie Hummel, Utah Demands Federal Government Return Public Lands to State, 
REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/24/us-utah-lands-
idUSBRE82N03420120324. 
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Rebellion,” came in response to the federal government’s enactment of 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).22 Numerous 
Western states and their Congressmen, including Utah Senator Orrin 
Hatch, became frustrated over President Jimmy Carter’s environmental 
policies, which restricted access to public lands by increasing grazing 
fees, scaling back drilling permits, and limiting access to natural 
resources.23 
Before Congress Passed FLPMA in 1976, federal lands were sold off 
consistently to the states and other private interests and purchasers. 
FLMPA dramatically reversed this longstanding policy and called for 
“public lands [to] be retained in Federal ownership unless . . . it is 
determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national 
interest.”24 This policy of national retention upset a great deal of 
landowners—especially in the West—because it extended federal control 
over these lands instead of gradually shifting it toward private and state 
ownership.25 FLPMA soon became a campaign issue, and Ronald 
Reagan even told supporters in a campaign speech that “[t]he next 
administration won’t treat the West as if it were not worthy of attention. 
The next administration will reflect the values and goals of the 
Sagebrush Rebellion. Indeed, we can turn the Sagebrush Rebellion into 
the Sagebrush Solution.”26  
 
Supporters of the rebellion made the movement more about state 
sovereignty concerns than access to lands, and they took legal action to 
support their views.27 Many credit Nevada State Senator Dean Rhoads 
with igniting the Sagebrush Rebellion because he initiated legislation, 
like several representatives in Utah, which asserted state authority over 
federal public lands. Supporters of the rebellion filed several lawsuits 
 
 22. Pub. L. No. 94-579 (1978). 
 23. Richard Blakemore, The Sagebrush Rebellion: A Response to Federal Land Policy in the 
West, 36 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 146, 148 (1981); see The Sagebrush Rebellion, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 1980, available at http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/ 
PVCC/mbase/docs/sagebrush.html. 
 24. Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 102(a)(1); see The Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976: How the Stage Was Set for BLM’s “Organic Act”, BUREAU OF 
LAND MGMT. (last visited Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.blm.gov/flpma/organic.htm. 
 25. The Sagebrush Rebellion, supra note 23. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE WEST 99 (1992). 
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against the Department of the Interior to cull federal protected land 
designations, but unlike the current movement in Utah, they did not 
focus on constitutional claims.28  
In 1980, President Reagan was elected, and the victory “cooled off 
the rebellion.”29 Supportive individuals in the Reagan Administration 
quickly recognized that the solution offered by the Sagebrush Rebellion 
was problematic because it would merely replace federal bureaucratic 
control with state bureaucratic control.30 Still, the sympathetic Reagan 
administration did work with state and local officials to develop a more 
collaborative regime of land management,31 an impact that is echoed in 
Secretary Salazar’s current efforts to co-manage land with state and local 
officials.32 Furthermore, the zeal from this movement lingered into the 
1990s and fueled the “County Supremacy Movement.” 
B. The 1990s and the County Supremacy Movement 
In the 1990s, Westerners again sought to shake federal control over 
public lands, but this time the fervor was stoked by President Clinton’s 
environmental policies. Legislators in Nevada were particularly ardent 
supporters of the movement because of the amount of the state’s land 
held by the federal government; the government today still owns nearly 
eighty-five percent of Nevada land.33  
The “County Supremacy Movement” came to a head in Nevada on 
July 4, 1994, when Nye County Commissioner Richard Carver bulldozed 
a road through Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada34 and arrested a 
 
 28. See, e.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (1986) (challenging a DOI 
conservation area designation in Idaho); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (1983) 
(challenging the DOI’s further designations on the land in Idaho). 
 29. Kurt J. Repanshek, New ‘Sagebrush Rebellion’ Smolders in Western States, L.A. TIMES; 
Dec. 2, 1990, at 24, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-12-02/news/mn-7915_1_sagebrush-
rebellion. 
 30. Steve H. Hanke, The Privatization Debate: An Insider’s View, 2 CATO J. 653, 655 
(1982). 
 31. Id. at 653. 
 32. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism 
and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 557 (1995); see also William 
Chaloupka, The County Supremacy and Militia Movements: Federalism as an Issue on the Radical 
Right, 26 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 161, 163 (1996). 
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Forest Service agent for trying to intervene.35 Carver acted in response to 
state legislation that had been passed in 1979 during the Sagebrush 
Rebellion, which asserted that the “State of Nevada owns all public lands 
within the borders of the State of Nevada.”36 Nevada was not the only 
state to pass such legislation—in fact, officials in New Mexico passed 
similar ordinances concerning federal public lands,37 as did as many as 
fifty-eight other counties throughout the West.38 Nye County officials 
were particularly upset, however, since in their county the United States 
owned nearly ninety-three percent of the land.39 
In response to Commissioner Carver’s actions, the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) filed a suit against the county and circulated a memo to 
federal officials reasserting federal control over these lands.40 County 
officials relied heavily on the Equal Footing Doctrine to mount their 
defense, but unlike Utah’s current efforts, they did not incorporate the 
Enclave Clause into their case. The County Supremacy Movement came 
to an end with the county’s failed defense of the DOJ lawsuit in 1996.41 
The New York Times  
 
 
deemed the result of the lawsuit “a major blow to dozens of counties that 
have passed [similar] ordinances.”42  
Although unsuccessful in his goal to recapture control of the federal 
lands, Commissioner Carver was content that federal officials had been 
increasingly cooperative in their land development efforts.43 Both the 
Sagebrush Rebellion and the County Supremacy Movement at the very 
 
 35. Landever, supra note 34, at 557–58; see also Paul Conable, Comment, Equal Footing, 
County Supremacy, and the Western Public Lands, 26 ENVT’L L. 1263, 1281 (1996). 
 36. NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.5973 (1979). 
 37. Chaloupka, supra note 34, at 162–63. 
 38. Id. at 163. 
 39. United States v. Nye Cnty., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (D. Nev. 1996). 
 40. Id. at 1109; DEPT. OF JUSTICE, United States Sues Nye County, Nevada to Reaffirm 
Control Over Federal Lands and Quell Intimidation of Federal Employees (Mar. 8, 1995), 
JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/March95/127.txt.html. 
 41. See Timothy Egan, Court Puts Down Rebellion Over Control of Federal land, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1996, at A1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Nevada’s ‘Sagebrush Rebel’ Happy with Results of His Defiant Bulldozing, DESERET 
NEWS (Nov. 13, 1996), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/524271/NEVADAS-SAGE BRUSH-
REBEL-HAPPY-WITH-RESULTS-OF-HIS-DEFIANT-BULLDOZING.html. 
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least can be credited with an increased willingness on the part of the 
federal government to collaborate on land management and regulatory 
concerns.44 
C. The State of Utah’s Efforts to Regain Control over its Public Lands 
Like the Sagebrush Rebellion and the County Supremacy Movement, 
Utah’s current campaign against the federal government formed in 
response to a new president’s restrictive land use policies—this time 
President Obama’s. In 2009, the Obama Administration suspended the 
sale of thirty-one oil and gas drilling parcels in Utah over concerns that 
the drilling would harm the surrounding wildlife.45 Earlier that year, 
Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar revoked seventy-seven leases that 
would have allowed for oil, gas, and mineral development on Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) land within Utah.46 In addition, Secretary 
Salazar instituted a process by which additional federal land would be 





development by giving it a “wild lands” designation,47 which has drawn 
 
 44. See Hanke, supra note 30. 
 45. Paul Foy, BLM Suspends Sale of Utah Drilling Leases, WY. TRIB. (June 23, 2009), 
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/blm-suspends-sale-of-utah-drilling-leases/article_0b673ad0-
4509-506c-be56-dc02d951a9a8.html. 
 46. Michael B. Farrell, Utah Uses Eminent Domain to Seize Land of . . . Uncle Sam, ABC 
NEWS (May 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/utah-eminent-domain-seize-land-uncle-
sam/story?id=10584565; Phil Taylor, Oil and Gas: BLM Did Not Improperly ‘Rush’ Canceled Utah 
Leases, IG Report Finds, E&E PUB. (July 15, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/ 
public/Landletter/2010/07/15/1. 
 47. See Julie Cart, Salazar Backpedals: Politics Stalls Wilderness Designation, Again, L.A. 
TIMES BLOG (June 11, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2011/06/ politics-places-
wilderness-designation-placed-in-limbo-.html. This “wild lands” designation process would inhibit 
development similar to the executive authority under the Antiquities Act, though it would only 
require secretarial approval to do so. See Press Release, Jason Chaffetz, Utah Congressional 
Delegation Supports Locally Driven Wilderness Approach (Sept. 8, 2011), available at 
http://chaffetz.house.gov/press-release/utah-congressional-delegation-supports-locally-driven-
wilderness-approach. 
Concerned members of Congress temporarily revoked Secretary Salazar’s authority to make 
these designations during FY 2011. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. 112-10, § 1769 (2011). Other states, including Utah, have taken 
legal action against the federal government to curb this authority as well. Brandon Loomis, Utah 
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a significant amount of criticism.48 
 
In response, Utah legislators passed legislation to reassert control 
over the affected lands. On February 11, 2010, Utah Representative 
Chris Herrod introduced legislation that effectively empowered the state 
of Utah to exercise eminent domain authority over federal lands that 
were not acquired in accordance with the United States Constitution.49 
The bill contained a pessimistically worded legislative note warning 
legislators of the constitutional challenges the bill would undoubtedly 
confront because of conflicts with the Property Clause and the Equal 
Footing Doctrine.50  
Two years later, and in the face of continued warnings that its claims 
would be deemed unconstitutional,51 the Utah State Legislature passed a 
series of bills claiming eminent domain authority on behalf of the State. 
Governor Herbert recently signed a bill sponsored by Representative Ken 
Ivory that calls on the federal government to return title of the vast 
majority of public land back to the state of Utah.52 Representative Ivory, 
who has spearheaded the most recent round of legislation, has noted that 
“[i]t’s a promise made to Utah 116 years ago at statehood.”53 
Utah’s congresspeople have backed the state legislature’s efforts by 
recently supporting a bill that would protect Utah’s lands from any 
further presidential monument designations.54 They have also supported 
 
Sues Feds over Wildlands Policy, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 14, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/ 
sltrib/politics/51720408-90/wilderness-lands-utah-policy.html.csp. 
 48. Because of the overwhelming response, Secretary Salazar has been forced to take a more 
collaborative approach to the process, and has even visited Utah multiple times to demonstrate that 
he is interacting locally. Cart, supra note 47; see also DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, Salazar Takes Next 
Steps in Push for Bipartisan Wilderness Agenda, (June 10, 2011), DOI.GOV, 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Takes-Next-Steps-In-Push-for-Bipartisan-
Wilderness-Agenda.cfm; Josh Loftin, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar Visiting Utah, DESERET NEWS 
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700183105/ Interior-Secretary-Ken-Salazar-
visiting-Utah.html. 
 49. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). The text of this bill is available online 
with an important legislative note at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/bills/hbillint /hb0143.pdf. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Robert Gehrke, Utah House Panel OKs Bill to Let Cities Seize Fed Land, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/53529358-90/authority-bill-cities-
counties.html.csp. 
 52. 2012 Utah Laws Ch. 353 (H.B. 148). 
 53. Bob Bernick, Bill Stakes Claim to Federal Lands in Utah, UTAHPULSE.COM (Jan. 30, 
2012), http://utahpulse.com/bookmark/17331882-Bill-Stakes-Claim-to-Federal-Lands-in-Utah. 
 54. Utah Lands Sovereignty Act, H.R. 2147, 112th Cong. (2011) (prohibiting the further 
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efforts to sell off more public lands, which has met some opposition 
(parodied by a recent Salt Lake Tribune political cartoon, below).55 Like 
many other members of Congress from the West, Utah’s delegation is 
concerned that the current administration will overextend federal 
authority under the Antiquities Act, which permits the president to make 
such designations.56  
The delegation has real cause for concern since President Clinton 
used his power under the Antiquities Act to protect 1.9 million acres of 
land in Southern Utah from development by giving it the designation of 
Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument.57 Utah’s state legislature 
is similarly concerned, and has ridden the recent anti-federal sentiment58 
by factoring the issue into the recent decennial redistricting process.59 
 
extension or establishment of national monuments in Utah except by express authorization of 
Congress);see also Press Release, Bishop, Chaffetz, Hatch, Lee Introduce Bill to Protect Utah from 
Presidential Monument Designations (June 14, 2011), available at 
http://lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=cb082493-7628-4a25-906b-3cc73349343c. 
 55. Thomas Burr, Chaffetz Pushes Bill to Sell ‘Excess’ Federal Lands, SALT LAKE TRIB. 
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/52774161-90/lands-chaffetz-utah-bill.html.csp; 
see Pat Bagley, Bagley Cartoon: Sign, Sign, Everywhere a Sign, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/52781990-82/sign-bagley-cartoon-everywhere.html.csp. 
 56. NAT’L PARKS SERV., National Monument Proclamations under the Antiquities Act, 
NPS.GOV, http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/hisnps/npshistory/monuments.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 
2012). For a thorough discussion of these concerns and the history of the Antiquities Act, see Frank 
Norris, The Antiquities Act and the Acreage Debate, GEORGE WRIGHT F., 2006, at 6, available at 
http://www.georgewright.org/233norris.pdf. 
 57. Kirk Johnson, In the West, ‘Monument’ Is a Fighting Word, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20utah.html. 
 58. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Federal Land Seizures Urged by Utah Governor, WALL ST. J. 
(March 30, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230437030457515169 
3915722022.html. 
 59. H.C.R. 17, 59th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010); see also Amy Joi O’Donoghue, Utah 
Legislature: Opposition to Future National Monuments Clears House, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 9, 
2010), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700014943/Utah-Legislature-Opposition-to-future-
national-monuments-clears-house.html; Josh Loftin, Public Lands Driving Utah Redistricting 
Debate, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com 
/news/ap/politics/2011/Oct/02/public_lands_driving_utah_redistricting_debate.html. 
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Utah’s state legislature and congressional delegation have both been 
strong proponents of local public land management and have brought 
attention to the state’s concerns, but opponents have attacked their bills, 
calling them mere “message bills.”60 Utah undoubtedly has several 
constitutional hurdles to clear,61 but Utah lawmakers feel that this 
opposition is worth challenging—especially considering the potential 
benefits to the state, including both control over land rich in natural 
resources and property tax revenues that would increase significantly.62 
Representative Herrod estimates that the coal reserves under Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument alone are valued at around $1 
trillion,63 and supporters see it as a chance to gain back “the right to 
develop the disputed land and generate some $50 billion for the state’s 
public schools.”64  
 
 60. Scott Streater, Utah Eminent Domain Law More than a “Message Bill”, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/01/01greenwire-utah-eminent-domain-law-
more-than-a-message-bi-25839.html?pagewanted=all. 
 61. This is especially true given the more recent failure of Nye County. See United States v. 
Nye Cnty., 920 F. Supp. 1108, 1109 (D. Nev. 1996); see also Eugene Volokh, Can a State Take 
Federal Land by Eminent Domain?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 29, 2010, 3:57 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/03/29/can-a-state-take-federal-land-by-eminent-domain/ (likening seizing 
federal property to taxing the Bank of the United States). 
 62. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). 
 63.  Chris Herrod, Reasserting State Sovereignty in Public Lands Management: The Eminent 
Domain Authority for Federal Lands Act, INSIDE ALEC, Nov./Dec. 2010, at 6–7. 
 64. Robert Gehrke, Utah Lawmakers Propose Using Eminent Domain to Take Federal Land, 
S.L. TRIB., Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.sltrib.com/ci_14377307. 
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Because the state’s actions do pose serious constitutional concerns, 
as noted by the state’s own legislative attorneys, this Comment will focus 
on the soundness of the state’s constitutional claims. A major premise of 
Utah’s claim is that it never ceded exclusive jurisdiction over the state’s 
public lands under the Enclave Clause.65 Furthermore, the state contends 
that the federal government has failed to divest itself of the state’s public 
lands in accordance with the Utah Enabling Act (UEA),66 which acts as a 
mandate on Congress to sell off the public lands that were temporarily 
entrusted to it during Utah’s admission into the Union. In making this 
argument, Utah lawmakers point to language in the UEA: “five per 
centum of the proceeds of the sales of public lands lying within said 
State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the 
admission of said State into the Union . . . shall be paid to the said 
State . . . .”67 State and local opposition to the federal government’s 
restrictions on public land use is nothing new, but the fact that Utah so 
centrally asserted its authority under the Enclave Clause is a position 
unique to this movement.68 Since the state has not yet filed suit, and 
hence there are no official legal arguments made by the state as of yet, 
this Comment will evaluate arguments that are both incorporated into 
legislation and commonly made by its lawmakers. Thus, any reference 
hereafter to the “state’s”  
 
claims or “Utah’s” claims refers only to likely arguments posited by state 
lawmakers and/or incorporated into legislation.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO UTAH’S CLAIMS 
To more fully understand how the state’s Enclave Clause argument 
is impacted by the UEA and the various aforementioned constitutional 
provisions, this Part of the Comment first briefly summarizes these 
interactions. It then reviews the text and history of the Enclave Clause 
and analyzes Utah’s cession of land in the Utah Enabling Act in light of 
this understanding. Finally, this Part examines the limitations and 
 
 65. Herrod, supra note 63; see also Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 §§ 3, 9 (1894). By public 
lands, these lawmakers are not referring to National Parks and other valid federal enclaves. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to -104 (West 2012). 
 66. Utah Enabling Act §§ 3, 9. 
 67. Id. § 9. 
 68. See Part II.A (Sagebrush Rebellion); II.B (The County Supremacy Movement). 
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challenges on Utah’s Enclave Clause argument by reviewing the 
Supreme Court’s Enclave Clause, Equal Footing, and Property Clause 
jurisprudence. 
A. A Brief Summary: Some Complex Constitutional Interactions 
It is impossible to gauge the strength of Utah’s Enclave Clause 
argument without first understanding how the Property Clause and the 
Equal Footing Doctrine potentially weaken the state’s claim. This Part 
briefly summarizes the impact of these provisions and how they bear on 
the Supreme Court’s possible future ruling and interpretation of the Utah 
Enabling Act. 
First, Utah is likely to face a challenge by the federal government’s 
authority under the Property Clause. As articulated in the Constitution, 
the Property Clause gives Congress the power to “dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution 
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or 
of any particular State.”69 
The authority granted to Congress here is quite encompassing— 
Congress may “dispose of” and “make all needful Rules and 
Regulations” concerning its lands.70 The Supreme Court has also 
interpreted this clause as a broad grant of authority—a power “without 
limitations.”71 Utah’s legislative attorneys have clearly identified the 
Property Clause as the single-largest barrier to the state’s claim.72  
However, the Property Clause extends only to “[t]erritory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”73 The state of Utah contends 
that the public lands in question do not rightfully “belong[] to the United 
States”74 because Congress was to “dispose of”75 these lands under the 
UEA. The language of the UEA seems to support this argument, since it 
provides that Utah would receive “five per centum of the proceeds of the 
sales of public lands lying within said State,” and that these public lands 
 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 530 (1976) (quoting United States v. San 
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); see also infra Part III.D. 
 72. Supra note 20. 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 74. Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. 
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“shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the admission of said 
State into the Union.”76 Although Congress previously divested itself of 
large sections of land under the UEA for schools and other government 
buildings,77 this ended with the passage of FLPMA in 1976.78 At 
bottom, to overcome a property clause challenge, Utah must successfully 
argue that federal ownership of the contested lands is outright invalid.  
Second, the federal government is likely to challenge Utah’s claim to 
eminent domain authority over the contested lands. Through HB 143, 
passed in 2010, Utah claimed eminent domain authority over lands not 
“owned by the federal government in accordance with the United States 
Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 17.”79 This provision, known as 
the Enclave Clause, gives Congress the power “[t]o exercise [exclusive 
legislation] over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature 
of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, 
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”80 
Because Congress did not acquire the public lands in question by consent 
and is not using the land for “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, 
and other needful Buildings,”81 the state claims the federal government 
lacks authority over the land.  
If Utah were to rely on this clause alone, however, it would face 
constitutional difficulties because the federal government may acquire 
land not only under the Enclave Clause, but also through the exercise of 
eminent domain, which supersedes state authority under the Supremacy 
Clause.82 Thus, although the Enclave Clause arguably pertains to only a 
very “narrow category of federal property,”83 later discussion will show 
that the federal government may also rightfully acquire land by eminent 
 
 76. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, (1894) (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. §§ 6–8. 
 78. FLPMA fundamentally altered the federal-state relationship with regards to public lands 
holdings—an issue that is discussed in more detail in Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah Williamson, 
The Story of Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83 
U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 146 (2011) (“The FLPMA required the BLM, for the first time, not only to 
coordinate with and ‘assure that consideration is given to’ relevant state-authorized plans, but also to 
‘provide for meaningful public involvement of State and local government officials.’”) (citing 43 
U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2006)). 
 79. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See infra Part III.D. 
 83. Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L. REV. 617, 
619 n.5 (1985). 
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domain for valid governmental purposes like national parks.84 However, 
Congress has not exercised such authority here. The millions of acres of 
federal public lands in question have never been acquired either through 
Congress’s Enclave Clause authority or through eminent domain. In sum, 
to survive a challenge to the state’s exercise of eminent domain, Utah 
must centrally assert that the federal government’s control of the 
contested lands is invalid, since it has neither obtained the land through 
the Enclave Clause nor claimed it through the exercise of eminent 
domain. The federal government is unlikely to make a claim of eminent 
domain here, as this would signify that it does not currently hold title to 
the contested lands.  
Third, and finally, the federal government will likely challenge 
Utah’s assertions under the Equal Footing Doctrine. While the doctrine 
itself is unlikely to fully support the state, the state is likely to use the 
Supreme Court’s broad dicta and federalism discussion on the issue. The 
Equal Footing Doctrine, as utilized by public lands movements in the 
past,85 can be summarized as follows: when a new state is admitted to 
the Union, it must be given the same legal and political rights as the 
preexisting states. In terms of authority over public lands, this means that 
states must be granted equal authority over public lands within their state 
boundaries. However, the doctrine may be limited to claims that concern 
the land underlying navigable waters.86 States’ rights supporters rely 
heavily on a particular statement in Pollard v. Hagan, though, to expand 
its reach: “[T]he United States never held any municipal sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory, of which Alabama or 
any of the new states were formed; except for temporary 
purposes . . . .”87 
Using this language, Utah is likely to argue that in order for states 
like Utah to be admitted on “equal footing,” the Court must interpret 
Utah’s cession of land under the UEA as being done “for temporary 
 
 84. See infra Part III.D. 
 85. See supra Parts II.A–.B. 
 86. For states admitted to the Union after the country’s formation, the Supreme Court has 
held (as in Pollard), that such an interpretation applied to the land underlying waterways. However, 
the Equal Footing Doctrine does not necessarily touch such a narrow category of land—the Supreme 
Court has also held that it acts as a limit on Congress from requiring anything in a state’s Enabling 
Act that would limit its future sovereignty as a state, including the power to change the location of a 
state capital. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911). 
 87. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 221 (1845). 
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purposes”88 only. Utah legislators have thus argued that the federal 
government was supposed to act only as a temporary trustee over Utah’s 
lands until the conditions in the UEA were fulfilled.89 The state’s public 
lands were then to be sold and the State was to receive five percent of the 
proceeds of those sales.90 
In support of its claim, Utah is likely to rely on supporting arguments 
offered by all of the aforementioned constitutional provisions—the 
Property Clause, the Enclave Clause, and the Equal Footing Doctrine. 
And for its claim to succeed, Utah must strategically employ the 
language from the UEA in light of these provisions—particularly the 
Enclave Clause—to argue that the federal government is bound by the 
UEA’s conditions and that it has never validly held title to the contested 
lands. 
 
B. History of the Constitution’s Enclave Clause 
To better understand the impact of the Enclave Clause, it is useful to 
review its history, as it lends some support to the federalism thrust of 
Utah’s argument. On August 18, 1787, delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention responded to the soldiers’ actions in Philadelphia by 
attempting to both establish a separate home for the federal government 
and meanwhile assuage the individual states that their sovereignty would 
not be violated. James Madison led the cause by proposing that Congress 
be given the power “[t]o exercise exclusively Legislative authority at the 
seat of the General Government, and over a district around the same, not 
exceeding [ten] square miles, the Consent of the Legislature of the State 
or States comprising the same, being first obtained.”91 Madison also 
proposed that the Convention “authorize the Executive to procure and 
hold for the use of the U.S. landed property for the erection of Forts, 
Magazines, and other necessary buildings.”92 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Herrod, supra note 65, at 7. 
 90. See Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). 
 91. James Madison, Madison Debates (Aug. 18, 1787), available at 
http://Avalon.law.yale.edu/ 18th_century/debates_818.asp. The Convention would decide on the size 
of ten square miles at a later date, the size which was incorporated into the Enclave Clause. U.S. 
CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 17. 
 92. Id. 
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The first of these powers was proposed in an effort to establish a 
central, geographical seat of authority for the nation that was to be free 
from the will of any individual state.93 Ultimately, Washington, D.C., 
was formed, and Congress obtained exclusive authority over the 
District.94 The Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s exclusive authority 
over the District soon after ratification.95 The second of these powers 
was proposed in an effort to extend the general legislative power to 
purchases of federal installations within the different states, though it 
was unclear whether federal legislative authority would supersede that of 
the state on these properties.96 Both proposals became part of what is 
now known as the “Enclave Clause,” which gives Congress the 
enumerated power 
 
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of 
Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of 
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority 
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State 
in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, 
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.
97
 
The final draft of the Enclave Clause limited the location and size of 
the district, but the most important limitation was that of consent—it 
ensured that any land conveyance for the district occur “by Cession” of 
each affected state, and that any other land purchase occur “by the 
Consent of the [state] Legislature.”98 Through an analysis of the 
constitutional debates and convention history, constitutional scholar 
Robert Natelson noted that these two limitations (location and size/ 
cession or consent) exemplify the emphasis the founders placed on 
protecting federalism in drafting the Enclave Clause.99 
 
 93. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 151–52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Kessinger Publishing 
2004); for a discussion of events that likely fomented this desire, see supra Part I. 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 95. Reily v. Lamar, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344, 354–55 (1805). 
 96. See Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution’s Property Clause: 
The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 346–47 & nn.96–97 (2005). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Natelson, supra note 96, at 346–57. 
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1. Place- and size-limitation requirement 
During the Constitutional Convention debates, several delegates 
expressed their concern over establishing any geographical district to 
seat the central government.100 Not only were delegates concerned over 
jurisdictional problems, but they also worried it might upset the 
federalism balance—namely, that it would give a “provincial tincture to 
[the National] deliberations.”101 Other delegates generally agreed that 
creating the District would prevent favoritism in New York or  
 
 
Philadelphia and would “better effectuate the fiduciary ideal of 
impartiality.”102 
Different sizes for the District were suggested, but to assuage 
concerns, those in favor of a central geographical District ensured that 
the District would be limited in size. During the Virginia ratifying 
convention, James Madison even ensured the representatives that the 
District “cannot exceed ten miles square.”103 This concern was echoed in 
ratifying conventions throughout the several states.104 Convinced that the 
size limitation had assuaged any fears of an overbearing federal 
government, Madison claimed that “[t]he extent of this federal district is 
sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite 
nature.”105 
Although these limitations may seem minor given the reach of 
Congress’s other enumerated powers,106 their symbolic importance is 
without question. Not only would the national government be separate in 
power and in kind from that of the states, but the federal government 
would also have its own separate geographic location over which it 
would exercise sovereign power. But this power would not extend 
beyond a small, ceded plot of land for the District, nor would it extend to 
any federal enclave other than “needful Buildings.”107 These 
 
 100. Id. at 353–55. 
 101. Col. Mason, Madison Debates (July 26, 1787), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
18th_century/debates_726.asp. 
 102. Natelson, supra note 96, at 350. 
 103. James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Debates, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 432. 
 104. Natelson, supra note 96, at 354 n.128. 
 105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 209 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). 
 106. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
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circumscribed limits not only act as a protection from federal 
encroachment onto state land,108 but they also symbolize the distinct 
separation between state and federal power. 
2. State-consent requirement 
Although the location and size limitations were important 
restrictions, even more essential to the successful passage of the Enclave 
Clause was its consent requirement for land purchases. The Framers 
were concerned that extensive land holdings by the federal government 
within the states “might be made use of to enslave any particular State by 
buying up its territory, and that the strongholds proposed would be a 
means of awing the State into an undue obedience to the [General] 
Government.”109 To ensure that this power was not abused, “after the 
word ‘purchased’ the words ‘by the consent of the Legislature of the 
State’” were added.110 
James Madison also noted the important federalism implication 
inherent in control over these installations: “The public money expended 
on such places and the public property deposited in them, requires that 
they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State.”111 As 
with the size limitation, the consent requirement (or concession, in the 
case of creating the District) was also an important theme in the state 
ratifying debates.112 In fact, many state convention representatives 
understood that this limitation was so reaching that individual states 
could place jurisdictional conditions on any cession of land.113 
The state consent requirement was not only a practical limitation, but 
also a symbolic limitation on federal authority. It was the states that 
would be tasked with ceding land for a national seat of government. It 
was the states that would have to agree to cede land purchased for 
 
 108. Natelson, supra note 95, at 353–54 (noting in particular that an overarching concern of 
the Anti-Federalists was that the Enclave Clause “might be abused” and that the Federal Government 
might use the enclaves, particularly military ones, “to intimidate the states and thereby undermine 
the independence of state governments from undue federal influence.”). 
 109. Mr. Gerry, Madison Debates (Sept. 5, 1787), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
18th_century/debates_905.asp. 
 110. 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 1, at 511 (Mr. King). 
 111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 209 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). 
 112. Natelson, supra note 96, at 355 n.132. 
 113. Id. 
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federal installations and “needful Buildings,”114 and it was the states that 
would set the limits on federal jurisdiction within these enclaves. As with 
the location and size limitations, the state consent requirement is another 
example of the federalism implications inherent in the text and history of 
the Enclave Clause.115 
C. Utah’s Enabling Act and the Argument Against Complete 
Jurisdictional Cession 
In light of the federalism underpinnings inherent in the text and 
history of the Enclave Clause, the impetus behind Utah’s current public 
lands debate and Enclave Clause arguments begins to become clear. In 
order to assess the validity of the state’s arguments, however, one must 
analyze the instrument through which Utah originally ceded its lands to 
the federal government—the Utah Enabling Act. 
1. An understanding of the UEA 
On July 16, 1894, after much anticipation, and some political and 
religious compromise,116 President Grover Cleveland signed Utah’s 
Enabling Act into law.117 Almost six months later, on January 4, 1896, 
President Cleveland welcomed Utah as a state into the Union by 
proclamation, thus taking the final step required for Utah statehood.118 
Although no legal challenges to the Act arose during Utah’s early years, 
the state’s current success depends heavily on connecting the Enclave 
Clause and Utah’s interpretation of the Enabling Act—specifically that 
the federal government has failed in its contractual obligations to sell off 
its land. 
As with the enabling acts used in many other admitted states, Utah’s 
 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 115. See also C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government to the Territories 
and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43, 43 (1949) (“[The landholding relation] is one of 
the most basic foundations of our federalism, if, indeed, it is not the corner stone.”); cf. Allan 
Erbsen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1168, 1237 (2011) (“[T]he Enclave Clause does 
not bar Congress from taking land from an unconsenting state by eminent domain.”) 
 116. For a discussion of the role of polygamy in Utah’s statehood prospects, see ORSON F. 
WHITNEY, POPULAR HISTORY OF UTAH 332–46 (1916). 
 117. Utah to Become a State, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1894, at 9, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F30811FC3C5415738DDDA10994 
DF405B8485F0D3. 
 118. WHITNEY, supra note 116, at 506. 
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Enabling Act set very specific conditions on Utah’s admission into the 
Union. It limited state and federal action in four important ways: (1) 
Utah ceded all “right and title” to unappropriated public lands to the 
United States119; (2) the state had to tax all landowners equally and could 
not tax federal property120; (3) some of these public lands would be 
given back to the state for state government and public buildings121; and 
(4) five percent of the proceeds from the sale of excess public lands 
would go back to the state for a common school trust fund. Utah’s public 
lands arguments hinge primarily on the first and fourth of these 
provisions.122 
2. Right and title 
One common argument made by Utah lawmakers is that, although 
Utah conceded all “right and title” to the unappropriated public lands in 
the state, it did not concede its jurisdiction over those lands.123 Section 3 
of the UEA concedes all right, title, and jurisdiction over Indian lands 
within the state, but for all other public lands, the state conceded only 
“right and title.” Utah lawmakers here rely on the canon of construction 
expressio unius to claim that Congress intended to exclude such 
jurisdiction as it relates to the state’s public lands. 
State Representative Chris Herrod has argued that this distinction 
 
 119. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 § 3 (1894). 
[T]he people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever 
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries 
thereof; and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian 
tribes; and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, 
the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said 
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of 
the United States . . . . Id.  
 120. Id. (“[T]he lands belonging to citizens of the United States residing without the said State 
shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the lands belonging to residents thereof; that no taxes shall 
be imposed by the State on lands or property therein belonging to or which may hereafter be 
purchased by the United States or reserved for its use.”). 
 121. Id. § 7 (Large sections of unappropriated public lands would be provided to “erect[] 
public buildings, at the capital of said State, when permanently located, for legislative, executive, 
and judicial purposes.”). 
 122. Id. § 9 (“That five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of public lands lying within 
said State, which shall be sold by the United States subsequent to the admission of said State into the 
Union, after deducting all the expenses incident to the same, shall be paid to the said State, to be 
used as a permanent fund, the interest of which only shall be expended for the support of the 
common schools within said State.”). 
 123. Id. § 3. 
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between “right and title” and jurisdiction is key to understanding the 
chain of title underlying Utah lands. In a recent article to the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), he argued:  
Utah did not give up its claim of jurisdiction or sovereignty. By 
forfeiting ‘right and title,’ Utah simply forfeited claim of ownership, 
which was needed to give clean title to the land. This is often referred 
to as ‘proprietary’ title and is the same type of ownership that any 
property owner holds. In contrast, Utah gave up ‘right, title, and 
jurisdiction’ over sovereign Indian lands within its boundaries.124 
Representative Herrod’s position is that the Enabling Act was but a 
medium through which the United States would hold the land 
temporarily to obtain “clean title” and wash away any lasting notion of 
territorial sovereignty. The federal government in this stage would be 
“more of a proprietor.”125 In turn, the excess public lands not dedicated 
to other purposes as outlined in the Act would eventually be sold back to 
the state or privatized, with five percent of the proceeds going to Utah’s 
common school trust fund. The federal government could purchase these 
lands “by the Consent of the Legislature”126—as required by the Enclave 
Clause—but if the lands were not sold off as agreed to, Utah’s position is 
that the federal government no longer has jurisdiction, and its right and 
title to the lands should be revoked because its right to hold title of the 
lands was only temporary.  
Instead, Utah lawmakers argue, the state may exercise its power of 
eminent domain over these excess public lands, sell or purchase them, 
and retain the five percent in its trust fund coffers.127 Although this 
argument is novel and unique to Utah because of the text of the UEA, the 
state’s argument must overcome a variety of obstacles: not only will the 
Equal Footing Doctrine and the Property Clause pose significant barriers, 
but the state will also face mounting political and environmental 
opposition to its cause. 
 
 124. Herrod, supra note 63, at 6. 
 125. Phil Taylor, U.S. Not ‘Sovereign’ Over Federal Lands, Utah GOP Senate Candidate 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/07/02/02greenwire-us-not-
sovereign-over-federal-lands-utah-gop-s-30438.html?pagewanted=all (quoting now-Senator Mike 
Lee). 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 127. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) for a discussion of the underpinnings of 
the federal-state eminent domain power. See also Note, The Power of a State to Condemn Land for a 
Federal Park, 44 YALE L.J. 1458 (1935). 
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But while the text and history of the UEA and the Enclave Clause 
seem to strongly support Utah’s authority to regain control of these 
contested lands, over 200 years of Supreme Court decisions have re-
shaped public lands issues. As such, it is important to analyze Utah’s 
potential argument in light of the Court’s Enclave Clause jurisprudence 
(collectively, the limitations imposed by the Property Clause,128 the 
federal government’s eminent domain authority,129 and the “Equal 
Footing doctrine,”130) as discussed below. 
D. Challenges Posed by the Property Clause 
First, the success of Utah’s Enclave Clause argument depends 
heavily on the extent of federal power under the Constitution’s Property 
Clause. 
1. The Property Clause: Text and structure 
The federalism implications inherent in the text and structure of the 
Property Clause might provide support for Utah’s defense of a Property 
Clause challenge, which is essentially that the United States holds a mere 
“proprietorship”131 over the land. If the land in Utah were still under 
control as federal property, then “Congress has the same power over it as 
over any other property belonging to the United States; and this power is 
vested in Congress without limitation . . . .”132 Utah lawmakers argue, 
however, that the state’s land in question is still retained only in an 
escrow-type holding, even though the United States is acting as both a 
broker and contracting party. After forming the new state, “the power of 
the United States over these lands, as property, was to cease.”133 To 
understand the extent of federal control over these specific lands, a more 
thorough analysis of the text of the Property Clause is warranted. 
The Constitution’s Property Clause gives Congress several powers, 
including the power “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
 
 128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see infra Part III.D. 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; see infra Part III.E. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see infra Part III.F. 
 131. As discussed, this refers to lands still within federal purview, but not yet “dispose[d]” of 
in accord with the UEA’s mandate that these lands “shall be sold.” Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 
§§ 6, 9 (1894). 
 132. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 537 (1840). See also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 
U.S. 529, 539 (1976). 
 133. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845). 
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Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the 
United States; and nothing in this Constitution  
 
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or 
of any particular State.”134 
On its face, the Property Clause grants a host of powers to 
Congress—if it owns the land, it can “dispose of” it and  “make all 
needful Rules and Regulations” concerning it.135 Furthermore, no state 
action can “Prejudice any [of] these Claims.”136 But Congress’s 
authority under this clause applies only to “[t]erritory and other Property 
belonging to the United States.”137 Thus, if the land does not belong to 
the United States, because the United States had disposed of the land in 
forming a new state under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1, then the 
federal government’s authority does not reach, unless it purchases the 
land or exercises its authority of eminent domain.  
The structure of the Property Clause within Section 3 lends support 
for a more state-protective interpretation of the Clause. There are only 
two clauses in Section 3—the first sets forth the procedure of forming 
new states,138 and the second (the Property Clause) discusses the 
procedure for disposing those lands. When read together with the first 
clause, the Property Clause can be seen as a call to Congress to dispose 
of lands it uses to form new states. This interpretation is strengthened by 
yet another structural argument: the Property Clause is located in Article 
IV, which contains a host of rights protective of the states. Unlike 
Congress’s authority to “purchase” lands under the Enclave Clause, 
which is part of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I, the Property 
Clause cannot be read as an enumerated power but instead (for disposal 
purposes) as a procedural limitation when it has decided to form a new 
state from its existent territorial holdings.  
 
 134. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any 
State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”). 
10-DRISCOLL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:42 PM 
999 Utah’s Enabling Act  
 1023 
 
2. The Property Clause after Kleppe 
Despite these potential insights, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Property Clause as a broad grant of authority to Congress. But if the 
Property Clause is read in light of the Enclave Clause as the Court 
interprets the UEA, however, this view may change, since the Court will 
be examining the Property Clause through a new lens—a contractual 
claim in an enabling act. 
After Congress passed FLPMA in 1976, it completely reversed 
direction in its policy to dispose of federal lands and instead “formally 
declared that its ‘ownership’ of public domain lands was permanent” 
through an exercise of its power under the Property Clause.139 Utah 
could argue here that this decision stands as an implicit recognition that 
congressional ownership was not “permanent,” and instead the standing 
policy since the Founding was to “dispose” of these lands (which is in 
line with the structural arguments noted above). However, the Supreme 
Court paved the way for a more expansive exercise of federal power 
when, months earlier, it decided Kleppe v. New Mexico.140 
At issue in Kleppe was an action by the New Mexico Livestock 
Board (NMLB) when it took and sold nineteen unbranded burros from 
BLM land. The United States contested the NMLB’s authority on the 
lands and argued that the Wild and Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act 
protected the burros from “capture, branding, harassment, or death.”141 
The Court held for the United States and gave the Property Clause a 
broad reading. Not only could Congress clearly manage and sell federal 
lands, but also when state action contradicts this authority, congressional 
legislation “necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the 
Supremacy Clause.”142 The Court’s preemptive view of federal authority 
on these lands struck yet another blow to supporters of federalism and 
the Sagebrush Rebellion.143 In fact, the language used by the Court was 
so broad as to seemingly undercut any hope that the Enclave Clause 
might pose for public lands movements—the Court held that the federal 
 
 139. Landever, supra note 34, at 597. 
 140. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 141. Pub. L. 92–195 (1971). 
 142. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543. 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
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government possessed “complete power,”144 “plenary power,”145 “police 
power,”146 “power . . . without limitations,”147 and “the powers . . . of a 
legislature over the public domain.’”148 
The Kleppe Court also discussed the Enclave Clause, and noted that 
while the acquisition of jurisdiction over lands within a state is the 
impetus of the Enclave Clause, it “has nothing to do with Congress’ 
powers under the Property Clause.”149 Absent such jurisdiction, 
Congress may still legislate with respect to its lands under its Property 
Clause authority.150 The implication of this distinction is that, to legislate 
under the Enclave Clause, Utah lawmakers must make a clear case for 
the application of the Enclave Clause and successfully argue that the 
federal government’s claim to the contested lands is invalid. Otherwise, 
the federal government’s exercise of authority under the Property Clause 
will necessarily invalidate the state’s exercise of eminent domain. 
3. Looking to the future: Commerce Clause federalism and the Enclave 
Clause 
What makes the Kleppe decision so intriguing in the context of state-
federal relations is that it was decided just a week before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in National League of Cities v. Usery.151 The Court’s 
decision in National League of Cities empowered states because the 
Court refused to extend Congress’s Commerce Clause authority under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which required states to apply minimum-
wage and maximum-hour requirements.152 Although the Court’s 
decision in Garcia v. San Metropolitan Transit Authority153 marked a 
clear change in direction for the Court from this position, the wake left 
 
 144. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 539. 
 148. Id. at 540; see WILKINSON, supra note 27, at 11 (for a broader discussion of the expanded 
property clause in Kleppe. 
 149. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 542. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 426 U.S. 833 (1976); for a much more thorough discussion of the possibilities of 
advancing the cause of federalism through the public lands debate, see Landever, supra note 34, at 
600. 
 152. National League of Cities, 426 U.S at 855. 
 153. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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behind after its decisions in United States v. Morrison154 and United 
States v. Lopez155 supports the prospective Utah case in terms of general 
support for federalism ideals. 
Although these cases touched on federalism through an analysis of 
the Commerce Clause authority, Utah lawmakers are undoubtedly 
hopeful that the Court will extend its federalism ideals through its 
analysis of the Enclave/Property Clause authority. A glimmer of hope for 
this future outcome came in the Court’s public lands decision in Utah 
Division of State Lands v. United States.156 Although this was an “equal 
footing” case and not an Enclave Clause case, the Court again 
emphasized the notion that Congress’s policy with respect to the 
government’s large land holdings was to “hold[] this land for the 
ultimate benefit of the future states.”157 Only in “exceptional instances” 
would it “defeat[] the future States’ title to the lands under navigable 
water.”158 A narrow reading may imply that the Court’s discussion only 
applies to the land “under navigable water,” but at the very least, the 
Court’s decision emphasizes that Congress must act with a “sufficiently 
plain” intent to defeat its prior policy of divestment.159 Given the wake 
effectuated by the Morrison and Lopez decisions, supporters are hopeful 
that the tide of federalism will work in their favor with public lands 
concerns as well. 
The hope for this position has increased following a couple of recent 
Supreme Court decisions. In Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the 
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a congressional Apology 
Resolution in any way limited the state’s sovereign authority to alienate 
state lands that were being held in a public trust.160 In 1893, Congress 
annexed the Hawaiian Islands and claimed sovereignty over the islands 
by passing the Newlands Resolution; Congress returned title to the 
islands to Hawaii in the 1959 Admission Act, under the condition that 
title be held in a public trust.161 The Supreme Court held that the 1993 
Apology Resolution in no way diminished this state authority because 
 
 154. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 155. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 156. 482 U.S. 193 (1987). 
 157. Id. at 209. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 203. 
 160. 556 U.S. 163 (2009). 
 161. Id. at 166–69. 
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“[t]he consequences of admission are instantaneous, and it ignores the 
uniquely sovereign character of that event . . . to suggest that subsequent 
events somehow can diminish what has already been bestowed.”162 The 
Court also extended this notion in broad strokes and held that “[this] 
proposition applies a fortiori where virtually all of the State’s public 
lands—not just its submerged ones—are at stake.”163 If the Court 
extends this principle, especially under the Equal Footing Doctrine, to 
the lands at issue in Utah, the state’s case becomes stronger yet. 
E. Eminent Domain and Separating Validly Held from Invalidly Held 
Lands 
The second major challenge to Utah’s case will likely be to Utah’s 
eminent domain claim. Utah’s argument here is, essentially, that the 
federal government has not properly divested itself of the state’s public 
lands in accordance with the UEA but has instead retained them 
invalidly. Because the federal government may obtain land both under 
the Enclave Clause and by transfer or through eminent domain, this 
section of the Comment will make clear that the state’s argument 
pertains to a different, third kind of landholding that is invalid—those 
lands which have been retained but not validly obtained. To do so, it 
addresses each category of land, in turn.  
1. Lands validly obtained under the Enclave Clause 
The first legal avenue through which the federal government can 
acquire land is state consent under the Enclave Clause although states 
can place conditions on any such transfer of land. In Fort Leavenworth 
Railroad Co. v. Lowe, for example, the state of Kansas retained the right 
to tax the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation when it ceded the land 
to the federal government as a federal enclave.164 When the state 
attempted to levy property taxes against installations on the reservation, 
the railroad company objected.165 In its decision, the Court articulated 
two important points about state transfers of lands under the Enclave 
Clause—first, states may decide to cede only conditional jurisdiction 
over the land; second, these conditions cannot run counter to the 
 
 162. Id. at 175. 
 163. Id. at 176. 
 164. 114 U.S. 525, 528 (1885). 
 165. Id. at 527. 
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purposes the enclaves are suited to fulfill.166 States might also choose to 
transfer the power of exclusive jurisdiction, which would bar any state 
restriction of federal authority.167  
The Court ultimately held that Kansas could tax the railroad that ran 
across the federal property, but the state could not exercise its sovereign 
authority—such as its taxing authority—over federal installations, like 
the Ft. Leavenworth military base.168 This is because it “would destroy 
or impair [the government’s] effective use for the purposes 
designed.”169 The Court also articulated the structural reason that 
Congress is given this power of “exclusive Legislation”170 over federal 
enclaves to make sure that these enclaves, or “places on which the 
security of the entire Union may depend,” would not “be in any degree 
dependent on a particular member of it.”171 
Although the holding in Fort Leavenworth greatly restricts the 
exercise of state authority on these lands, the Court did emphasize that 
the federal government could only construct truly “needful Buildings” on 
the land.172 If the land is used for other purposes, then “the legislative 
power of the state over the places acquired will be as full and complete 
as over any other places within her limits.”173 In fact, the Court reiterated 
the validity of the state exercise of eminent domain authority on federal 
land and stressed that the federal government must obtain consent if it 
desires to purchase state land.174 If a state refuses to consent, the land 
 
 166. Id. at 539. 
 167. Id. at 542. 
 168. Id. at 541–42. 
 169. Id. at 539. 
 170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. For a discussion of the distinction between “exclusive 
jurisdiction” and “exclusive Legislation” (the terminology of the Enclave Clause), see David E. 
Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 288–90, nn.9–15 
(1976). 
 171. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 530. 
 172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 173. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 539; see also Murphy v. Love, 249 F.2d 783, 786 (10th 
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958) (discussing the validity of state taxation on federal 
lands, though not on federal installations). Congress has also validated this exercise. 4 U.S.C. § 105 
(2006) (preventing individuals from claiming a tax exemption because the purchase was made on 
federal land). 
 174. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 531–32. It is important to note that the Fort Leavenworth 
decision is read generally as a strong limitation on state sovereignty and jurisdiction. Because the 
Court reiterated that the federal government had the power of eminent domain and clear sovereign 
authority for its purposes within federal enclaves harbored within the states, this understanding is 
warranted. However, the case should not be read as a complete destruction of state sovereignty over 
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retained by the federal government would still be open to valid exercises 
of state authority—including that of eminent domain: 
Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the 
United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some 
other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in 
that case, unless used as a means to carry out the purposes of the 
government, is subject to the legislative authority and control of the 
states equally with the property of private individuals.175 
However far this authority may extend, the Supremacy Clause176 
prevents states from abusing their jurisdictional authority, but they may 
reserve and exercise concurrent jurisdiction over these lands.177 
 
2. Lands validly obtained by transfer or by eminent domain 
One question that remained unanswered after Fort Leavenworth was 
the extent of state authority over lands within this second category—
lands validly obtained by the federal government through means other 
than the Enclave Clause, such as eminent domain. In Collins v. Yosemite 
Park & Curry Co., the Supreme Court initially answered this question 
flexibly in a dispute over the state exercise of jurisdiction in Yosemite 
National Park.178 In 1920, the state of California transferred the 
Yosemite Valley to the federal government but qualified the cession by 
retaining the authority to tax.179 The Court noted that in these situations, 
 
public lands. By setting a clear line that the federal government could only exercise this authority 
over “needful Buildings” and terminating federal authority over land not acquired in accordance 
with the Enclave Clause, this Comment argues that it should also be read to emphasize the vitality of 
the Enclave Clause. 
 175. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added). It is worth noting here that this 
very language was alluded to by Senator Mike Lee when discussing Utah’s exercise of eminent 
domain under the Enclave Clause. See Taylor, supra note 125. 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 177. E.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Bd. of Supervisors v. United 
States, 408 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1976), dismissed, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1977) (both cases 
discussing the potential for overlapping jurisdictional coverage where the state exercise of 
jurisdiction does not impede the federal government’s purpose for acquiring the land). For a more 
recent example of concurrent jurisdiction, see Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031 
(N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 178. 304 U.S. 518 (1938); see also James, 302 U.S. at 134. 
 179. Collins, 304 U.S. at 530. 
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“[t]he States of the Union and the National Government may make 
mutually satisfactory arrangements as to jurisdiction of territory within 
their borders and thus in a most effective way, cooperatively adjust 
problems flowing from our dual system of government.”180 Like under 
the Enclave Clause, here states and the federal government can together 
decide how to divide jurisdiction over the land. Many states opt to cede 
exclusive jurisdiction because of the sheer cost of policing and 
maintaining certain public lands.181 
But where a state has not ceded land and instead the federal 
government has acquired it by eminent domain, for example, a shared 
jurisdictional arrangement may not be desired or agreeable. In these 
instances, as noted in Kleppe, the federal government possesses 
“complete power” over these lands under the Property Clause.182 In a 
separate case particularly pertinent to Utah’s argument, Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the federal 
government possesses broad authority over federal land within the states 
(including, here, BLM land). Furthermore, these powers supersede any 
eminent domain claim by a state.183 In Utah Power & Light Co., state 
officials authorized the construction of a power plant on a federal forest 
reservation without the consent of the federal government.184 The Court 
held that state consent was not sufficient authorization, even if the land 
was “not used or needed for a fort or other governmental purpose of the 
United States” under the Enclave Clause.185 This is because Congress 
can obtain land through means other than the Enclave Clause, including 
under the Property Clause.186 
In order to survive the holding in Utah Power & Light Co., Utah 
must make a new argument here: instead of merely arguing that the 
federal government did not obtain the contested lands under the Enclave 
Clause, it must argue that the federal government did not obtain the lands 
 
 180. Id. at 528. 
 181. For example, Nevada ceded jurisdiction over the Lake Mead National Recreation Area 
because of budgetary concerns over maintenance and policing of the area. See Charles F. Wilkinson, 
The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PUB. LAND L. 
REV. 1 (1980). 
 182. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976). 
 183. Utah Power and & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917). 
 184. Id. at 399. 
 185. Id. at 403–04. 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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by any valid means. This avenue—challenging the federal government’s 
title to the land under the UEA—is the only way to overcome the federal 
government’s broad authority under the Property Clause. Otherwise, the 
Court will hold for the federal government, as in Utah Power & Light 
Co., that “only through [congressional action] can rights in lands 
belonging to the United States be acquired.”187 In that case, the Court 
also made clear that “state laws, including those relating to the exercise 
of the power of eminent domain, have no bearing upon a controversy 
such as is here presented, save as they may have been adopted or made 
applicable by Congress.”188 In light of this outcome, commentators have 
generally concluded that Utah’s exercise of eminent domain on these 
lands would be futile.189 That is, of course, unless Utah is able to make  
 
clear that is argument pertains only to a third, and distinct category of 
lands. 
3. Third—and finally—lands retained but not validly divested 
Given the extensive reach of federal authority on its land holdings as 
discussed above, in order for Utah to succeed, it must make clear that its 
claim relates to a different category of land altogether. The final question 
that remains unanswered, and which Utah is likely to pose to the court, is 
the extent of federal authority over lands that have been retained by the 
federal government since a state’s admission into the Union but that have 
never been validly divested under a state’s enabling act or otherwise 
legally acquired. The Court has yet to address this question, since 
previous cases never hinged on such a condition. The state of Utah will 
almost certainly argue that federal authority over the vast majority of its 
public lands holdings within the state is invalid because it was supposed 
to divest itself of these lands in accordance with the UEA.190 
 
 187. Utah Power & Light Co., 243 U.S. at 404. 
 188. Id. at 405. 
 189. See, e.g., Scott Streater, Utah Eminent Domain Law More than a “Message Bill,” NY 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/01/01greenwire-utah-eminent-domain-
law-more-than-a-message-bi-25839.html?pagewanted=all; Nicholas Riccardi, In Utah, A Move to 
Sieze Federal Land, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/03/nation/la-na-
utah-domain3-2010mar03; Eugene Volokh, “Can a State Take Federal Land by Eminent Domain?” 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 29, 2010: 3:57 P.M.), http://volokh.com/2010/03/29/can-a-state-take-
federal-land-by-eminent-domain/. 
 190. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 §§ 3, 9 (1894). 
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Although Utah Power & Light Co. clearly established that a state 
may not exercise its power of eminent domain over public lands obtained 
by valid congressional and executive action,191 large percentages of land 
in Utah (excluding lands such as national parks, which the federal 
government has properly obtained) are still being retained by the federal 
government and have never been sold off as required under the UEA.192 
These are the lands that Utah lawmakers are specifically concerned 
about. Since the federal government has still not divested itself of these 
lands, Utah has lost out on millions of dollars in property taxes and in 
access to natural resources.193  
The Supreme Court has clearly held that the federal government 
possesses broad powers over land it has obtained under the Enclave 
Clause and through other valid congressional or executive action, so 
Utah must successfully distinguish its claim and argue that the federal 
government has failed to divest itself of these lands under the UEA and 
has not otherwise validly obtained them. Utah must make the case that, 
after more than a century, Congress is still bound by the conditions it 
agreed to in 1894.  
F. Pollard, Equal Footing, the Supremacy Clause, and Some Promising 
Dicta 
Third, and finally, the federal government will likely challenge 
Utah’s interpretation of, and argument concerning, the Equal Footing 
Doctrine. Though Utah will clearly rely on the Enclave Clause in support 
of its position, it also seems poised to provide a renewed interpretation of 
this doctrine despite a forceful legislative note against such a position.194 
The argument concerning the Equal Footing Doctrine, as utilized by 
public lands movements in the past,195 can be summarized as follows: 
when a new state is admitted to the Union, it must be given the same 
legal and political rights as the preexisting states; in terms of authority 
over public lands, this means that states must be granted equal authority 
 
 191. 243 U.S. at 405. 
 192. The state of Utah has acknowledged the validity of a number of federal land holdings in 
its most recent bill, which excludes these lands from its purview, including national parks and 
national monuments. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63L-6-101 to 104 (2010) (West 2012). 
 193. See Herrod, supra note 63, at 7; UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL LAND 
TRUST (2012), available at http://www.schoollandtrust.org/school-trust/school-fund/. 
 194. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-503.5 (West 2010). 
 195. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
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over public lands within their state boundaries, though some see the 
doctrine as limited to land underlying waterways.196 Support for this 
view stems from the 1845 Supreme Court decision of Pollard v. 
Hagan197 in which the Court applied the Equal Footing Doctrine to 
reject federal ownership of land underlying waterways.198 The Court’s 
very broad dicta are often cited as support for the position that Pollard is 
also applicable to dry land. In fact, this position has been consistently 
held by states’ rights activists protesting federal control over public 
lands.199 
Under dispute in Pollard was a stretch of land underlying the Mobile 
River in Alabama. The two parties to the dispute had been granted 
conflicting deeds—one from the federal government and one from the 
state. The Alabama Supreme Court validated the defendants’ deed to the 
land, which was granted to them by the state.200 The Plaintiffs appealed, 
contending that their title to the land was valid because it had been 
granted to them by patent, which had been affirmed by Congress.201 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision and 
validated the defendants’ deed, holding that the federal government did 
not possess sovereign power over the land underlying the Mobile River 
in Alabama.202 Instead, the Court held that the land was ceded only 
temporarily to the Union before Alabama became a state, and the federal 
government’s exercise of municipal sovereignty over that land ceased 
following Alabama’s transition into statehood.203 Although the Court 
recognized that the federal government had the power to regulate 
interstate waterways under its Commerce Clause authority,204 it also held 
 
 196. For states admitted to the Union after the country’s formation, the Court has held (as it 
did in Pollard), that such an interpretation applied to the land underlying waterways. However, the 
Equal Footing Doctrine does not necessarily encompass such a narrow view—the Supreme Court 
has also held that it acts as a limit on Congress from requiring anything in a state’s enabling act that 
would limit its future sovereignty as a state, including the power to change the location of a state 
capital. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 197. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
 198. Id. at 230. 
 199. This includes the “Sagebrush Rebellion” and the “County Supremacists;” see Parts II.A 
and II.C. 
 200. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230. 
 201. Id. at 221. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 229–30. 
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that the federal government’s power did not extend to ownership of the 
land, which had never been ceded to the United States.205 Exercising 
such overreaching sovereignty over these lands, the Court held, would be 
“repugnant to the Constitution.”206 
Because the land at issue in the case was only the land underlying the 
river, some read Pollard narrowly as an express limit on federal 
ownership of land underlying waterways.207 Some subsequent Supreme 
Court precedent also seems to support this view, though the doctrine has 
in certain instances been applied more generally as well.208 
Notwithstanding, there is a strong argument to be made for its 
applicability to federal ownership of public lands generally. In fact, one 
scholar argues that “it is the very generality of the Court’s chosen 
language and analysis that indicates that the Court did not view the 
power over submerged lands as different from the power over other lands 
held temporarily by the federal government.”209 
States’ rights supporters, including numerous Utah legislators, rely 
on a key phrase from the Pollard decision in their arguments: “We think 
a proper examination of this subject will show, that the United States 
never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and 
to the territory, of which Alabama or any of the new states were formed; 
except for temporary purposes.”210 The fact that the Court did not 
specifically limit its holding to lands under waterways, coupled with the 
fact that the Court very openly disavowed the exercise of federal 
“municipal sovereignty” and “jurisdiction” over lands ceded, suggests 
that the holding might extend to dry land. In relation to the Court’s 
specific Enclave Clause jurisprudence, this is of extreme significance; if 
the United States could hold right in the soil only for “temporary 
purposes,”211 it would seem to suggest that the UEA should be read in a 
similar light, which implies that the federal government should have 
 
 205. Id. at 224; see also Part III.F (Utah’s own case against the federal government is likely to 
touch on whether or not the land and exclusive jurisdiction over it was ever ceded to the federal 
government). 
 206. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 224. 
 207. Conable, supra note 35, at 1281. 
 208. For another example of the Court applying the doctrine to land underlying waterways, see 
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987). For a case involving other state 
lands, see Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 209. Landever, supra note 34, at 575. 
 210. 44 U.S. at 221. 
 211. Id. 
10-DRISCOLL.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:42 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1034 
divested itself of its non-committed public lands soon after the UEA was 
enacted. 
But while Pollard can be read to support Utah’s position, subsequent 
Supreme Court precedent tends to undercut such support. For example, 
the Supreme Court has held that the Equal Footing Doctrine only 
guarantees political equality, specifically “[e]quality of constitutional 
right and power.”212 Because all of the western states were admitted 
under similar circumstances and given equal political rights then, the 
argument goes, the large areas of public lands held by the federal 
government are rightly held. Some cite this political equality argument as 
fundamental to the doctrine and discount a more extensive application of 
Pollard.213 However, Utah could rightly argue that by holding nearly 
sixty percent or more of the land within the state’s boundaries,214 the 
federal government retains such exacting control over the land and its 
resources that it limits the state’s ability to function as a political 
equivalent when the state’s economy relies so heavily on the extraction 
of natural resources. Because the UEA serves as a binding contract 
between Utah and the federal government, this “political equality” 
argument would be only secondary to the United States’ fulfillment of its 
promises to Utah. In addition, an understanding of the concept of limited 
landholdings by the federal government through an analysis of the 
Enclave Clause215 supports the notion that these lands should be 
divested—especially when the Property Clause is seen as a call to the 
federal government to do so in the process of forming new states.216 
Scholars note that whatever reading is given to Pollard, it must be 
read carefully so as not to view the Supreme Court’s holding as an 
unlimited grant of federal authority on public lands.217 This is especially 
so in light of the Pollard Court’s statement concerning state cession of 
land: 
The object of all the parties to these contracts of cession, was to convert 
 
 212. Escanaba and Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883). 
 213. Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism 
Implications of a 1990s States’ Rights Battle, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 460–66 (1997). 
        214. The Open West, Owned by the Federal Government, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/23/us/western-land-owned-by-the-federal-
government.html. 
 215. See Part III.B.1. 
 216. See id. 
 217. Landever, supra note 33. 
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the land into money for the payment of the debt, and to erect new states 
over the territory thus ceded; and as soon as these purposes could be 
accomplished, the power of the United States over these lands, as 
property, was to cease.218 
At bottom, Pollard still stands as a notable limitation on federal Enclave 
Clause authority.  
IV. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE AVENUES FOR SUCCESS 
Although Supreme Court jurisprudence in terms of the Enclave 
Clause, the Equal Footing Doctrine, and the Property Clause seems 
mixed, the hope these provisions provide for Utah’s argument in terms of 
the UEA is nonetheless significant. First, the history of the Enclave 
Clause demonstrates the importance of limited federal landholdings, and 
the text of the Enclave Clause demonstrates the importance of state 
consent when lands are purchased for use as federal enclaves. It also 
demonstrates the caution present in the Framers’ tone while drafting the 
Enclave Clause so as not “to enslave any particular State by buying up its 
territory.”219 
The text and structure of the Property Clause also support Utah’s 
argument. Congress was to “dispose” of its lands in forming new states 
while it retained full power to make “rules and regulations” over the land 
while it still held it as territorial property.220 This power also extends to 
land claimed by the federal government by eminent domain. In its 
argument, it is important for Utah to distinguish its case from the line of 
Supreme Court Property Clause cases while still highlighting the 
underlying policies of the Property Clause and Section 3 in general. To 
do so, it must make clear that its argument pertains only to lands over 
which the federal government does not hold valid title.  
The Equal Footing Doctrine also provides, at minimum, some 
rhetorical support for Utah’s position. Even though equal footing cases 
generally apply only to lands underlying waterways, the Court’s broad 
dicta in Pollard emphasize the United States’ policy of divesting the 
federal government of lands in the process of forming new states. This 
notion is repeated in the UEA when, concerning the non-committed 
public land, Congress agreed that the lands “shall be sold by the United 
 
 218. Pollard v. Hansen, 44 U.S. 212, 224 (1845). 
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States subsequent to the admission of said State into the Union.”221 
Justice O’Connor’s more recent opinion in Utah Division of State Lands 
v. United States also provides support for federalism ideals in the process 
of state divestment of lands.222 
But any hope contained in each of these possible arguments seems 
doomed in light of Supreme Court precedent—particularly in relation to 
the Property Clause. The Court’s broad interpretation of the clause, 
together with cases that narrow the reach of the Equal Footing Doctrine 
and the potential scope of the Enclave Clause, make the state’s success 
going forward very unlikely. Utah’s best chance of success lies in the 
somewhat untouched potential that the Enclave Clause holds, particularly 
when read together with Utah’s century-old Enabling Act. Like the 
soldiers surrounding the Philadelphia statehouse in 1783, it seems that 
Utah legislators’ demands will be unfulfilled by the federal government. 
But even if their case is unsuccessful in full, they have succeeded in 
scaling back the Obama Administration’s restrictive land use policies.  
*Spencer Driscoll 
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